1995/09/01 by David Austen-Smith, David Austen‐Smith · 464 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Access to information #Business #Computer science #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Information access #Law #Legislature #Microeconomics #Political science #Positive economics #Preference #Public economics #Public relations #Revealed preference #Value (mathematics)
paper · doi:10.2307/2082974
published in American Political Science Review 89(3), 566-581 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 1995/09/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/27
An important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given. In this story, access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy-relevant information. Under complete information regarding donors' policy preferences, I argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups' and the recipient legislators' preferences are similar. However, one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive. Relaxing the informational assumption on donors' preferences, I reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the (informational) value of access to any agent is endogenous.