2023/11/09 by Yangfan Zhou, Zhou, Yangfan
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2311.05758
openalex publication_date 2023/11/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
I study collective dynamic information acquisition. Players decide when to stop sequential sampling via a collective stopping rule, which specifies decisive coalitions that can terminate information acquisition upon agreement. I develop a methodology to characterize equilibria using an ex ante perspective. Instead of stopping strategies, players choose distributions over posterior beliefs subject to majorization constraints. Equilibrium sampling regions are characterized via a fixed-point argument based on concavification. Collective sampling generates learning inefficiencies and having more decisive coalitions typically reduces learning. I apply the model to committee search and competition in persuasion.