2025/09/24 by Héctor Hermida‐Rivera, Hermida-Rivera, Héctor
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2509.19823
openalex publication_date 2025/09/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
This note characterizes every qualified majority voting rule in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and q-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives if and only if some alternative is strictly top-ranked by at least q voters. Thus, this note generalizes May's (1952, Theorem, p. 682) characterization of the simple majority voting rule to qualified majority voting rules. In doing so, it shows that qualified majority voting rules are distinguished by their degree of neutrality.