2018/09/05 by Carlos Murguia, Iman Shames, Murguia, Carlos +5
Computer Science · Engineering · #FOS: Electrical engineering #Formal Methods in Verification #Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis #Security and Verification in Computing #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1809.01808
openalex publication_date 2018/09/05 · openalex created_date 2022/08/03 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and\nas attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become\nclear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection.\nThe term stealthy has come to encompass a variety of techniques that attackers\ncan employ to avoid being detected. In this manuscript, for a class of\nperturbed linear time-invariant systems, we propose two security metrics to\nquantify the potential impact that stealthy attacks could have on the system\ndynamics by tampering with sensor measurements. We provide analysis\nmathematical tools (in terms of linear matrix inequalities) to quantify these\nmetrics for given system dynamics, control structure, system monitor, and set\nof sensors being attacked. Then, we provide synthesis tools (in terms of\nsemidefinite programs) to redesign controllers and monitors such that the\nimpact of stealthy attacks is minimized and the required attack-free system\nperformance is guaranteed.\n