2023/01/31 by Andreas Haupt, Zoë Hitzig, Haupt, Andreas +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · Engineering · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Sharing Economy and Platforms #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) #Transportation and Mobility Innovations
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2301.13404
openalex publication_date 2023/01/31 · openalex created_date 2023/02/03 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed regulations aim to increase transparency, especially in digital markets. In order to understand when opacity arises in contracting and the potential effects of proposed regulations, we study a moral hazard model in which a risk-neutral principal faces a continuum of weakly risk-averse agents. The agents differ in an observable characteristic that affects the payoff of the principal. In a described contract, the principal sorts the agents into groups, and to each group communicates a distribution of output-contingent payments. Within each group, the realized distribution of payments must be consistent with the communicated contract. A described contract is transparent if the principal communicates the realized contract to the agent ex-ante, and otherwise it is opaque. We provide a geometric characterization of the principal's optimal described contract as well as conditions under which the optimal described mechanism is transparent and opaque. We apply our results to the design and description of driver payment schemes on ride-hailing platforms.