2016/10/05 by Doron Zarchy, Zarchy, Doron, Amogh Dhamdhere +5
Engineering · Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #ICT Impact and Policies #Digital Platforms and Economics #Merger and Competition Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1610.01314
The current framework of Internet interconnections, based on transit and\nsettlement-free peering relations, has systemic problems that often cause\npeering disputes. We propose a new techno-economic interconnection framework\ncalled Nash-Peering, which is based on the principles of Nash Bargaining in\ngame theory and economics. Nash-Peering constitutes a radical departure from\ncurrent interconnection practices, providing a broader and more economically\nefficient set of interdomain relations. In particular, the direction of payment\nis not determined by the direction of traffic or by rigid customer-provider\nrelationships but based on which AS benefits more from the interconnection. We\nargue that Nash-Peering can address the root cause of various types of peering\ndisputes.\n