Controlling network coordination games

2019/12/17 by Durand, Stephane, Como, Giacomo, Fagnani, Fabio
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1912.07859

Abstract

We study a novel control problem in the context of network coordination games: the individuation of the smallest set of players capable of driving the system, globally, from one Nash equilibrium to another one. Our main contribution is the design of a randomized algorithm based on a time-reversible Markov chain with provable convergence garantees.

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