2024/07/06 by Olivier Lindamulage de Silva, Samson Lasaulce, De Silva, Olivier Lindamulage +5 · 1 citation
Mathematics · Physics and Astronomy · #COVID-19 epidemiological studies #Complex Network Analysis Techniques #FOS: Electrical engineering #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.05020
openalex publication_date 2024/07/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy (PoA)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics.