Blameworthiness in Security Games

2019/10/18 by Naumov, Pavel, Tao, Jia · 1 citation
#Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Logic (math.LO) #Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.08647

Abstract

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.

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• Responsibility Gap and Diffusion in Sequential Decision-Making Mechanisms

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