2025/10/21 by Mishra, Debasis, Sarkar, Soumendu, Arunava Sen +5
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare #School Choice and Performance #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2510.18708
openalex publication_date 2025/10/21 · openalex created_date 2025/10/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to achieve its goals is the redeployment of teachers from surplus to deficit (in teacher strength) schools. We consider a model where teachers can either remain in their initially assigned schools or be transferred to a deficit school in their acceptable set. The planner's objective is specified in terms of the post-transfer deficit vector that can be achieved. We show that there exists a transfer whose post-transfer deficit vector Lorenz dominates all achievable post-transfer deficit vectors. We provide a two-stage algorithm to derive the Lorenz-dominant post-transfer deficit vector, and show that this algorithm is strategy-proof for teachers.