2024/03/27 by Jair Certório, Certório, Jair, Nuno C. Martins +5
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #92D10 #92D25 #Dynamical Systems (math.DS) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2403.18164
openalex publication_date 2024/03/27 · openalex created_date 2024/03/31 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
We consider a large population of learning agents noncooperatively selecting strategies from a common set, influencing the dynamics of an exogenous system (ES) we seek to stabilize at a desired equilibrium. Our approach is to design a dynamic payoff mechanism capable of shaping the population's strategy profile, thus affecting the ES's state, by offering incentives for specific strategies within budget limits. Employing system-theoretic passivity concepts, we establish conditions under which a payoff mechanism can be systematically constructed to ensure the global asymptotic stability of the ES's equilibrium. In comparison to previous approaches originally studied in the context of the so-called epidemic population games, the method proposed here allows for more realistic epidemic models and other types of ESs, such as predator-prey dynamics. The stability of the equilibrium is established with the support of a Lyapunov function, which provides useful bounds on the transient states.