Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof

2008/05/19 by M. Pinter, Pinter, M.
Computer Science · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #cs.GT

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0805.2797

11 pages

arxiv created 2012/03/10 · arxiv updated 2012/03/13

Abstract

We consider Young (1985)'s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.

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