Two presumptions in Goedel's interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning that are classically objectionable

2007/03/24 by Anand, Bhupinder Singh
#03B10 #FOS: Mathematics #General Mathematics (math.GM)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.math/0703723

Abstract

Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet Goedel's, explicitly stated, requirement of classically constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, reasoning. We see how these objections can be addressed, and note some consequences.

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