2013/08/29 by Xavier Vilaça, Vilaça, Xavier, Luı́s Rodrigues +1
Physics and Astronomy · Mathematics · Social Sciences · #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #COVID-19 epidemiological studies #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1308.6526
This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an\nincentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The\ndissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At\nthe end of each stage, a monitoring mechanism informs each player of the\nactions of other nodes. The effectiveness of a punishing strategy is measured\nas the range of values for the benefit-to-cost ratio that sustain cooperation.\nThis paper studies both public and private monitoring. Under public monitoring,\nwe show that direct reciprocity is not an effective incentive, whereas full\nindirect reciprocity provides a nearly optimal effectiveness. Under private\nmonitoring, we identify necessary conditions regarding the topology of the\ngraph in order for punishments to be effective. When punishments are\ncoordinated, full indirect reciprocity is also effective with private\nmonitoring.\n