2025/11/04 by Wang, Fuyi, Sun, Fangyuan, Fan, Mingyuan +5
#Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.02176
Privacy-preserving biometric authentication (PPBA) enables client authentication without revealing sensitive biometric data, addressing privacy and security concerns. Many studies have proposed efficient cryptographic solutions to this problem based on secure multi-party computation, typically assuming a semi-honest adversary model, where all parties follow the protocol but may try to learn additional information. However, this assumption often falls short in real-world scenarios, where adversaries may behave maliciously and actively deviate from the protocol. In this paper, we propose, implement, and evaluate \sysname, a \underlineFlexible and \underlineLightweight biometric \underlineAuthentication scheme designed for a \underlineMalicious \underlineEnvironment. By hybridizing lightweight secret-sharing-family primitives within two-party computation, \sysname carefully designs a line of supporting protocols that incorporate integrity checks with rationally extra overhead. Additionally, \sysname enables server-side authentication with various similarity metrics through a cross-metric-compatible design, enhancing flexibility and robustness without requiring any changes to the server-side process. A rigorous theoretical analysis validates the correctness, security, and efficiency of \sysname. Extensive experiments highlight \sysname's superior efficiency, with a communication reduction by 97.61× ∼ 110.13× and a speedup of 2.72× ∼ 2.82× (resp. 6.58× ∼ 8.51×) in a LAN (resp. WAN) environment, when compared to the state-of-the-art work.