2008/05/02 by Yücel Altuğ, Yucel Altug, Altug, Yucel +3
Computer Science · Mathematics · #Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption #Coding theory and cryptography #Cryptographic Implementations and Security #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Information Theory (cs.IT) #cs.CR #cs.IT #math.IT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0805.0268
30 pages, Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
arxiv created 2008/05/02 · openalex publication_date 2008/05/02 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
A new approach on cryptanalysis is proposed where the goal is to explore the fundamental limits of a specific class of attacks against a particular cryptosystem. As a first step, the approach is applied on ABSG, which is an LFSR-based stream cipher where irregular decimation techniques are utilized. Consequently, under some mild assumptions, which are common in cryptanalysis, the tight lower bounds on the algorithmic complexity of successful Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks are derived for two different setups of practical interest. The proofs rely on the concept of ``typicality'' of information theory.