2025/01/07 by Antonio Piccolomini d’Aragona, d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #FOS: Mathematics #Logic (math.LO) #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Philosophy, Science, and History
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2501.07588
openalex publication_date 2025/01/07 · openalex created_date 2025/01/17 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
I provide an overview of some of Sundholm's remarks on the history and philosophy of logic. In particular, I focus on Sundholm's proposal to explain meaning with no object-language/metalanguage distinction, and to provide a consequently contentual approach to formalisms for proofs. When applied to Gentzen's Natural Deduction in its two 1935 and 1936 variants, this triggers a reading of each variant as pointing to one of the poles in the distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, also introduced by Sundholm. I suggest that the basis of this picture is given by a Martin-Loefian reading of the notion of analytic assertion.