2021/06/23 by Balázs Pejó, Pejó, Balázs, Gergely Biczók +1
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #COVID-19 Digital Contact Tracing #COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts #COVID-19 epidemiological studies #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2106.12329
openalex publication_date 2021/06/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19\nincluding wearing masks, social distancing, virus testing, contact tracing, and\nvaccination. However, combining these measures into an efficient holistic\npandemic response instrument is even more involved than anticipated. We argue\nthat some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these\nmeasures are selfish decision making and the differing national implementations\nof the response mechanism. In this paper, through simple games, we show the\neffect of individual incentives on the decisions made with respect to mask\nwearing, social distancing and vaccination, and how these may result in\nsub-optimal outcomes. We also demonstrate the responsibility of national\nauthorities in designing these games properly regarding data transparency, the\nchosen policies and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a\nmechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to\ncarefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their\nrespective pandemic response mechanism; moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all\nsolution when designing an effective solution.\n