Costly Persuasion

2014/05/01 by Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica · 9 citations
Decision Sciences · #Game Theory and Applications #Auction Theory and Applications #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics

paper · doi:10.1257/aer.104.5.457

Abstract

We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.

Citations

• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Bayesian Persuasion

Cited by

• Experimental Cost of Information
• Information Design: A Unified Perspective
• Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Persuasion
• Generative AI as Digital Representatives in Collective Decision-Making: A Game-Theoretical Approach
• When and what to learn in a changing world
• Credible Scores
• Harnessing Information in Incentive Design
• Convex Cost of Information via Statistical Divergence
• Persuasion under the Threat of Verification

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