Rank-1 Games With Exponentially Many Nash Equilibria

2012/11/11 by Bernhard von Stengel, von Stengel, Bernhard
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Economic theories and models

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1211.2405

Abstract

The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is the rank of the matrix A+B. We give a construction of rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria, which answers an open problem by Kannan and Theobald (2010).

Related

• Enumerating the Nash equilibria of rank 1-games
• Rank-1 Bi-matrix Games: A Homeomorphism and a Polynomial Time Algorithm
• Games of fixed rank: A hierarchy of bimatrix games
• A Manifold of Polynomial Time Solvable Bimatrix Games
• Rank Reduction in Bimatrix Games