2013/01/28 by Mingsheng Ying, Ying, Mingsheng, Yuang Feng +3 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1301.6804
openalex publication_date 2013/01/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Duo to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems.