2008/06/24 by Ilker Yildirim, Yildirim, Ilker, Haluk O. Bingol +2
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) #cs.MA #physics.soc-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0806.3938
9 pages
arxiv created 2008/06/24 · openalex publication_date 2008/06/24 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In a setting where heterogeneous agents interact to accomplish a given set of goals, cooperation is of utmost importance, especially when agents cannot achieve their individual goals by exclusive use of their own efforts. Even when we consider friendly environments and benevolent agents, cooperation involves several issues: with whom to cooperate, reciprocation, how to address credit assignment and complex division of gains, etc. We propose a model where heterogeneous agents cooperate by forming groups and formation of larger groups is promoted. Benefit of agents is proportional to the performance and the size of the group. There is a time pressure to form a group. We investigate how preferring similar or complement agents in group formation affects an agent's success. Preferring complement in group formation is found to be better, yet there is no need to push the strategy to the extreme since the effect of complementing partners is saturated.