On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates

2011/03/26 by M. I. Shehata, Shehata, M. I.
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Medicine · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #FOS: Biological sciences #Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models #Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE) #q-bio.PE

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1103.5150

arxiv created 2011/03/26 · openalex publication_date 2011/03/26 · arxiv updated 2011/03/29 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of coexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1,r3 -> infinity cooperation is the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit cooperators.

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