2014/06/18 by Michael Kearns, Kearns, Michael, Lili Dworkin +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Corporate Finance and Governance #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Merger and Competition Analysis #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1406.4837
arxiv created 2014/06/18 · openalex publication_date 2014/06/18 · arxiv updated 2014/06/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We report the results of a computational study of repacking in the FCC Incentive Auctions. Our interest lies in the structure and constraints of the solution space of feasible repackings. Our analyses are "mechanism-free", in the sense that they identify constraints that must hold regardless of the reverse auction mechanism chosen or the prices offered for broadcaster clearing. We examine topics such as the amount of spectrum that can be cleared nationwide, the geographic distribution of broadcaster clearings required to reach a clearing target, and the likelihood of reaching clearing targets under various models for broadcaster participation. Our study uses FCC interference data and a satisfiability-checking approach, and elucidates both the unavoidable mathematical constraints on solutions imposed by interference, as well as additional constraints imposed by assumptions on the participation decisions of broadcasters.