2024/02/22 by Justin Chan, Chan, Justin
Earth and Planetary Sciences · #Aquatic and Environmental Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2402.14952
openalex publication_date 2024/02/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs to each coalition under some non-cooperative solution concept coincide with their value in the cooperative game, the cooperative game is said to be implementable and the non-cooperative game its implementation. This paper proves that all strictly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium; and that all weakly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Discussion then proceeds on the appropriate choice of non-cooperative solution concept for the implementation.