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Proof of Backhaul: Trustfree Measurement of Broadband Bandwidth

2022/10/20 by Peiyao Sheng, Nikita Yadav, Sheng, Peiyao +11 · 1 citation
Computer Science · #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Distributed systems and fault tolerance #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Mobile Ad Hoc Networks #Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) #Opportunistic and Delay-Tolerant Networks

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2210.11546

openalex publication_date 2022/10/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Recent years have seen the emergence of decentralized wireless networks consisting of nodes hosted by many individuals and small enterprises, reawakening the decades-old dream of open networking. These networks have been deployed in an organic, distributed manner and are driven by new economic models resting on tokenized incentives. A critical requirement for the incentives to scale is the ability to prove network performance in a decentralized trustfree manner, i.e., a Byzantine fault tolerant network telemetry system. In this paper, we present a Proof of Backhaul (PoB) protocol which measures the bandwidth of the (broadband) backhaul link of a wireless access point, termed prover, in a decentralized and trustfree manner. In particular, our proposed protocol is the first one to satisfy the following two properties: (1) Trustfree. Bandwidth measurement is secure against Byzantine attacks by collaborations of challenge servers and the prover. (2) Open. The barrier-to-entry for being a challenge server is low; there is no requirement of having a low latency and high throughput path to the measured link. At a high-level, our protocol aggregates the challenge traffic from multiple challenge servers and uses cryptographic primitives to ensure that a subset of challengers or, even challengers and provers, cannot maliciously modify results in their favor. A formal security model allows us to establish guarantees of accurate bandwidth measurement as a function of the fraction of malicious actors. Our evaluation shows that our PoB protocol can verify backhaul bandwidth of up to 1000 Mbps with less than 8% error using measurements lasting only 100 ms. The measurement accuracy is not affected in the presence of corrupted challengers. Importantly, the basic verification protocol lends itself to a minor modification that can measure available bandwidth even in the presence of cross-traffic.

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