2022/10/20 by R. Pablo Arribillaga, Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Agustín G. Bonifacio +1 · 3 citations
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2210.11627
openalex publication_date 2022/10/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top. Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.