Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems

2019/10/19 by Bryan Ford, Ford, Bryan, Rainer Böhme +1 · 2 citations
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Blockchain Technology Applications and Security #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Distributed systems and fault tolerance #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.08820

openalex publication_date 2019/10/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We outline a metacircular argument explaining why it is rational to be irrational when attacking open-world decentralized systems, and why systems whose security depend on rationality assumptions are insecure.

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