2020/01/31 by Benoît Sohet, Sohet, Benoît, Yézékaël Hayel +5
Energy · Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure #Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Transportation and Mobility Innovations
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.11758
openalex publication_date 2020/01/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Electric Vehicles (EV) impact urban networks both when driving (e.g., noise\nand pollution reduction) and charging. For the electrical grid, the flexibility\nof EV charging makes it a significant actor in "Demand Response" mechanisms.\nTherefore, there is a need to design incentive mechanisms to foster customer\nengagement. A congestion game approach is adopted to evaluate the performance\nof such electrical transportation system with multiple classes of vehicles: EV\nand Gasoline Vehicles. Both temporal and energy operating costs are considered.\nThe latter is nonseparable as it depends on the global charging need of all EV,\nwhich is scheduled in time by a centralized aggregator in function of\nnonflexible consumption at charging location. Thus, driving and charging\ndecisions are coupled. An adaptation of Beckmann's method proves the existence\nof a Wardrop Equilibrium (WE) in the considered nonseparable congestion game;\nthis WE is unique when the charging unit price is an increasing function of the\nglobal charging need. A condition on the nonflexible load is given to guarantee\nthe monotonicity of this function. This condition is tested on real consumption\ndata in France and in Texas, USA. Optimal tolls are used to control this\nelectrical transportation system and then computed in order to minimize an\nenvironmental cost on a simple network topology.\n