Stochastic Games for Security in Networks with Interdependent Nodes

2010/03/11 by Kien C. Nguyen, Nguyen, Kien C., Tansu Alpcan +3 · 2 citations
Computer Science · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #cs.CR #cs.GT

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1003.2440

arxiv created 2010/03/11 · arxiv updated 2010/03/15

Abstract

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. Such a network can be modeled using weighted directed graphs with the edges representing the influence among the nodes. The game can be formulated as a non-cooperative zero-sum or nonzero-sum stochastic game. However, due to correlation among the nodes, if some nodes are compromised, the effective security assets and vulnerabilities of the remaining ones will not stay the same in general, which leads to complex system dynamics. We examine existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution and also provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.

Cited by

• Omniscient Attacker in Stochastic Security Games with Interdependent Nodes
• Incentivizing Collaboration for Detection of Credential Database Breaches

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