2014/09/24 by Giannakopoulos, Yiannis
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1409.6925
We provide a new, much simplified and straightforward proof to a result of Pavlov [2011] regarding the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling two goods with uniformly i.i.d. valuations over intervals [c,c+1], to an additive buyer. This is done by explicitly defining optimal dual solutions to a relaxed version of the problem, where the convexity requirement for the bidder's utility has been dropped. Their optimality comes directly from their structure, through the use of exact complementarity. For c=0 and c≥ 0.092 it turns out that the corresponding optimal primal solution is a feasible selling mechanism, thus the initial relaxation comes without a loss, and revenue maximality follows. However, for 0