2023/02/20 by Xiang Sun, Sun, Xiang, Xu Jin +3
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Operations research #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2302.09861
openalex publication_date 2023/02/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality result holds within the class of semi-symmetric conflict network structures: both the aggregate actions and equilibrium payoffs under two regimes are the same. We also show that, in some sense, the Tullock form is necessary for such a neutrality result. Moving beyond the Tullock family, we further demonstrate how the curvature of contest technology shapes the welfare and effort effects.