2011/01/12 by Katharina Fischer, Fischer, Katharina
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Probability (math.PR) #cs.GT #math.PR
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1101.2337
arxiv created 2011/01/12 · openalex publication_date 2011/01/12 · arxiv updated 2011/01/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff, which depends on the set of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero. For analysis of quitting games the so called one-step games are used. Important properties of the expected payoff and of equilibria in one-step games are stated. Furthermore some relations between equilibria in one-step games and equilibria in quitting games are considered. This analysis of the structure of quitting games and the related one-step games should provide a basis for an implementation of an algorithm that detect equilibria in Quitting Games.