2014/10/24 by Daniele Vilone, Vilone, Daniele, Francesca Giardini +3
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) #Social and Information Networks (cs.SI)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1410.6625
openalex publication_date 2014/10/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving\nhas a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves\nmore than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups\ncooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to\ninvestigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the\nevolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network\nstructure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with\npartner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount\nof time.\n