2020/02/18 by Franci, Barbara, Grammatico, Sergio · 3 citations
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2002.08318
We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for monotone games that requires one proximal computation (e.g., one projection step) and one pseudogradient evaluation per iteration. Our main contribution is to extend the relaxed forward-backward operator splitting by Malitsky (Mathematical Programming, 2019) to the stochastic case and in turn to show almost sure convergence to a SGNE when the expected value of the pseudogradient is approximated by the average over a number of random samples.