2024/06/24 by Navin Kartik, Kartik, Navin, Francesco Squintani +3 · 12 citations
Social Sciences · #FOS: Economics and business #Philosophy #Political science #Revelation #Social Media and Politics #Theology #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2406.17084
published in arXiv (Cornell University) (Cornell University)
openalex publication_date 2024/06/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result.