2018/04/27 by Ferraioli, Diodato, Ventre, Carmine
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1804.10512
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli&Ventre, AAAI 2017], is to find a small (possibly, the smallest) set of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fines for lies or verifying a linear number of agents.