2020/07/26 by Divya Siddarth, Siddarth, Divya, Sergey Ivliev +5 · 1 voice · 9 citations
Computer Science · Social Sciences · #Blockchain Technology Applications and Security #Privacy, Security, and Data Protection #User Authentication and Security Systems #cs.CR
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2008.05300
openalex publication_date 2020/07/26 · openalex created_date 2022/07/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Most current self-sovereign identity systems may be categorized as strictly\nobjective, consisting of cryptographically signed statements issued by trusted\nthird party attestors. This failure to provide an input for subjectivity\naccounts for a central challenge: the inability to address the question of "Who\nverifies the verifier?". Instead, these protocols outsource their legitimacy to\nmechanisms beyond their internal structure, relying on traditional centralized\ninstitutions such as national ID issuers and KYC providers to verify the claims\nthey hold. This reliance has been employed to safeguard applications from a\nvulnerability previously thought to be impossible to address in distributed\nsystems: the Sybil attack problem, which describes the abuse of an online\nsystem by creating many illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress\nin cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge\nin networked protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting,\nvouching, and interpreting, to arrive at a decentralized and sybil-resistant\nconsensus for identity. In this article, we will outline the approaches of\nthese new and natively digital sources of authentication -- their attributes,\nmethodologies strengths, and weaknesses -- and sketch out possible directions\nfor future developments.\n