Optical-pumping attack on a quantum key distribution laser source

2025/03/14 by Fadeev, Maxim, Ponosova, Anastasiya, Peng, Qingquan +3 · 4 citations
#FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Physics (quant-ph)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2503.11239

Abstract

We report a new type of vulnerability in practical implementations of quantum key distribution systems. We show that it is possible to increase the pulse energy of a source laser diode not only by injection-locking it by external light near its emission wavelength of 1550 nm, but also by optically pumping it at a much shorter wavelength. We demonstrate 10% increase in pulse energy when exposing the laser diode to 1310-nm, 1.6-mW cw laser light via its fiber pigtail. This may allow an eavesdropper to steal the secret key. A possible countermeasure is to install broadband optical filters and isolators at the source's output and characterise them during the security certification.

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