Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms

2025/11/17 by Endre Csóka, Csóka, Endre
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.15727

openalex publication_date 2025/11/17 · openalex created_date 2025/11/23 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

For a general class of dynamic stochastic multi-player problems, Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov, and Teytelboym (2024) proposed prior-dependent efficient collusion-proof mechanisms. The present paper proves prior-free lifting theorems, at the price of lower guaranteed utility levels that depend on the set of possible initial type profiles. As a special case, we implement a 0.872-approximately utility-maximizing prior-free collusion-proof mechanism for the Markovian repeated single-good allocation problem studied by Fikioris, Banerjee, and Tardos (2025).

Citations

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