2024/10/15 by Jiayi Li, Li, Jiayi, Matt Motoki +3
Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2410.11296
openalex publication_date 2024/10/15 · openalex created_date 2024/10/20 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The introduction of aggregator structures has proven effective in bringing fairness to energy resource allocation by negotiating for more resources and economic surplus on behalf of users. This paper extends the fair energy resource allocation problem to a multi-agent setting, focusing on interactions among multiple aggregators in an electricity market. We prove that the strategic optimization problems faced by the aggregators form a quasiconcave game, ensuring the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This resolves complexities related to market price dependencies on total purchases and balancing fairness and efficiency in energy allocation. In addition, we design simulations to characterize the equilibrium points of the induced game, demonstrating how aggregators stabilize market outcomes, ensure fair resource distribution, and optimize user surplus. Our findings offer a robust framework for understanding strategic interactions among aggregators, contributing to more efficient and equitable energy markets.