2025/02/26 by Frank Yang, Yang, Frank, Kai Hao Yang +1 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.18876
openalex publication_date 2025/02/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We characterize the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions from [0,1]n to [0,1], as well as the extreme points of the set of one-dimensional marginals of these functions. These characterizations lead to new results for various mechanism design and information design problems, including public good provision with interdependent values; interim efficient bilateral trade mechanisms; mechanism (anti) equivalence; asymmetric reduced form auctions; and optimal private private information structure.