2022/05/11 by Chao Huang, Huang, Chao
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) #econ.TH
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2205.05599
openalex publication_date 2022/05/11 · arxiv created 2022/05/13 · arxiv updated 2022/05/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms' acceptable sets. We also provide a class of preference profiles that satisfy this condition. Our results indicate that stable matching is compatible with a wide range of firms' complementary preferences.