2014/02/03 by Sébastien Mathieu, Mathieu, Sébastien, Quentin Louveaux +5
Decision Sciences · Engineering · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computational Engineering #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electric Power System Optimization #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Finance #Smart Grid Energy Management #and Science (cs.CE)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1402.0362
openalex publication_date 2014/02/03 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We propose and analyze a day-ahead reserve market model that handles bids\nfrom flexible loads. This pool market model takes into account the fact that a\nload modulation in one direction must usually be compensated later by a\nmodulation of the same magnitude in the opposite direction. Our analysis takes\ninto account the gaming possibilities of producers and retailers, controlling\nload flexibility, in the day-ahead energy and reserve markets, and in imbalance\nsettlement. This analysis is carried out by an agent-based approach where, for\nevery round, each actor uses linear programs to maximize its profit according\nto forecasts of the prices. The procurement of a reserve is assumed to be\ndetermined, for each period, as a fixed percentage of the total consumption\ncleared in the energy market for the same period. The results show that the\nprovision of reserves by flexible loads has a negligible impact on the energy\nmarket prices but markedly decreases the cost of reserve procurement. However,\nas the rate of flexible loads increases, the system operator has to rely more\nand more on non-contracted reserves, which may cancel out the benefits made in\nthe procurement of reserves.\n