2009/06/25 by Pedro Peris‐Lopez, Pedro Peris-Lopez, Peris-Lopez, Pedro +10
Computer Science · Engineering · #Advanced Authentication Protocols Security #Antenna Design and Analysis #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Full-Duplex Wireless Communications #RFID technology advancements #cs.CR
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0906.4618
31 pages, 10 figures, 1 table
openalex publication_date 2009/06/25 · arxiv created 2010/06/20 · arxiv updated 2010/06/22 · openalex created_date 2022/10/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The vast majority of RFID authentication protocols assume the proximity\nbetween readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel.\nHowever, in real scenarios an intruder can be located between the prover (tag)\nand the verifier (reader) and trick this last one into thinking that the prover\nis in close proximity. This attack is generally known as a relay attack in\nwhich scope distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks are included.\nDistance bounding protocols represent a promising countermeasure to hinder\nrelay attacks. Several protocols have been proposed during the last years but\nvulnerabilities of major or minor relevance have been identified in most of\nthem. In 2008, Kim et al. [1] proposed a new distance bounding protocol with\nthe objective of being the best in terms of security, privacy, tag\ncomputational overhead and fault tolerance. In this paper, we analyze this\nprotocol and we present a passive full disclosure attack, which allows an\nadversary to discover the long-term secret key of the tag. The presented attack\nis very relevant, since no security objectives are met in Kim et al.'s\nprotocol. Then, design guidelines are introduced with the aim of facilitating\nprotocol designers the stimulating task of designing secure and efficient\nschemes against relay attacks. Finally a new protocol, named Hitomi and\ninspired by [1], is designed conforming the guidelines proposed previously.\n