2024/02/21 by Siyang Xiong, Xiong, Siyang
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2402.13580
openalex publication_date 2024/02/21 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance). First, if a solution concept is additive, implementation in sequential-move games is equivalent to implementation in simultaneous-move games. Second, for any solution concept \rho and any social choice function f, we identify a canonical operator γ^(\rho,f), which is defined on primitives. We prove that, if \rho is monotonic, f can be implemented by a sequential-move game if and only if γ^(\rho,f) is achievable, which translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions defined on primitives. Most of the existing solution concepts are either additive or monotonic.