2010/02/23 by Haoyang Wu, Wu, Haoyang
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1002.4298
arxiv created 2010/02/23 · openalex publication_date 2010/02/23 · arxiv updated 2010/02/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption is questionable. It is more reasonable to let the receiver recognize the pattern of the sender. In this paper, we investigate what happens if the assumption is relaxed. A framework of signaling games with pattern recognition and an example are given.