2025/02/27 by Sommer, Yonatan, Hikri, Ivri, Amit, Lotan +1 · 1 citation
#FOS: Computer and information sciences #Machine Learning (cs.LG)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.20012
When learning is used to inform decisions about humans, such as for loans, hiring, or admissions, this can incentivize users to strategically modify their features, at a cost, to obtain positive predictions. The common assumption is that the function governing costs is exogenous, fixed, and predetermined. We challenge this assumption, and assert that costs can emerge as a result of deploying a classifier. Our idea is simple: when users seek positive predictions, this creates demand for important features; and if features are available for purchase, then a market will form, and competition will give rise to prices. We extend the strategic classification framework to support this notion, and study learning in a setting where a classifier can induce a market for features. We present an analysis of the learning task, devise an algorithm for computing market prices, propose a differentiable learning framework, and conduct experiments to explore our novel setting and approach.