2018/10/16 by Erik Sy, Christian Burkert, Hannes Federrath +1 · 3 voices
Computer Science · Social Sciences · #Computer science #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #Privacy, Security, and Data Protection #Session (web analytics) #Spam and Phishing Detection #The Internet #Tracking (education) #Web browser #World Wide Web #cs.CR
paper · pdf · doi:10.1145/3274694.3274708
published as Published in 2018 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '18), December 3-7, 2018, San Juan, PR, USA · 11 pages
arxiv created 2018/10/16 · openalex publication_date 2018/12/03 · arxiv updated 2019/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
User tracking on the Internet can come in various forms, e.g., via cookies or by fingerprinting web browsers. A technique that got less attention so far is user tracking based on TLS and specifically based on the TLS session resumption mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first that investigate the applicability of TLS session resumption for user tracking. For that, we evaluated the configuration of 48 popular browsers and one million of the most popular websites. Moreover, we present a so-called prolongation attack, which allows extending the tracking period beyond the lifetime of the session resumption mechanism. To show that under the observed browser configurations tracking via TLS session resumptions is feasible, we also looked into DNS data to understand the longest consecutive tracking period for a user by a particular website. Our results indicate that with the standard setting of the session resumption lifetime in many current browsers, the average user can be tracked for up to eight days. With a session resumption lifetime of seven days, as recommended upper limit in the draft for TLS version 1.3, 65% of all users in our dataset can be tracked permanently.