2025/06/18 by Hermida-Rivera, Héctor, Kerman, Toygar T. · 2 citations
#FOS: Economics and business #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.15265
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule.